Determining when to challenge the Examining Attorney's likelihood of confusion refusal (also known as a 2(d) Refusal) is always a challenging task. A recent decision by the Board provides guidance to applicants, suggesting that they should contest the Examining Attorney's evidence regarding the relatedness of goods if it is limited to citing only a few websites selling the same goods as the applicant and registrant. In the case of In re Pfanner Schutzbekleidung GmbH, Application Serial No. 79247130 (August 5, 2021) [not precedential], the Board overturned the Examining Attorney's refusal, finding insufficient evidence of the relatedness of the goods.
In this particular case, the applicant sought to register the mark PFANNER STRETCHFLEX for protective clothing and sporting gear, including items such as accident and fire protection garments, shin guards, and knee and elbow pads for sports. It's worth noting that the applicant already held a related registration for the mark PFANNER covering similar goods in classes 9 and 28. However, this prior registration did not prevent the Examining Attorney from refusing the applicant's mark for PFANNER STRETCHFLEX. The Examining Attorney relied on the mark STRETCHFLEX as the basis for the refusal, even though the registrant's goods were underwear and loungewear, specifically pants, shorts, and tops in international class 25, without offering any protective clothing or safety gear.
To support the 2(d) refusal, the Examining Attorney submitted excerpts from third-party websites demonstrating the use of the same trademark to brand the relevant products of both the applicant and the registrant. Five websites were presented as evidence:
(1) one example displayed advertisements for underwear, thermal wear, and flame retardant clothing;
(2) another example showed a website selling flame-resistant clothing and protective gloves;
(3) a third example featured a website selling golf and baseball gloves under the same brand as shin guards;
(4) a fourth example advertised underwear, knee pads, and shin guards; and (5) a fifth example displayed the same mark branding underwear, batting gloves, and lacrosse gloves.
Out of these five examples, two websites sold both protective gear and underwear/loungewear under the same trademark, while three websites sold both sporting protective gear and underwear/loungewear under the same mark. Under trademark law, the relatedness of goods does not necessitate that the products be identical or directly competitive. Instead, the law requires some connection between the goods or the conditions under which they are marketed, leading to the encounter of the goods by the same individuals. When the marks are similar, this can create a mistaken belief that the goods come from the same source.
Regarding the similarities of the marks, the Board concluded that they were indeed similar because they both incorporated the term STRETCHFLEX. The Board emphasized that while there is no per se rule stating that the incorporation of another party's mark in its entirety automatically establishes similarity, it is typically found to be the case. In fact, Examining Attorneys often consider the marks to be similar and supportive of confusion when one party's mark is wholly incorporated by another. Additionally, trademark law includes a rule stating that the mere addition of a term to a registered mark does not eliminate the similarities between the marks when evaluating likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act. Therefore, du Pont factor one favored a finding of confusion.
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The DuPont factors are a set of 13 criteria that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) uses to assess the likelihood of confusion between trademarks. In other words, these factors help determine whether a new trademark can be registered or might infringe on someone else’s existing mark. Courts also use the Dupont factors to resolve cases of trademark infringement.
The primary DuPont factors in the STRETCHFLEX case are (1) the similarity of the marks, (2) the similarity of the goods and services, and (3) the similarity of the channels of trade The Board also addressed du Pont factor six, which considers the number and nature of similar marks on similar goods and the strength of the registered mark. The evidence did not demonstrate that the shared term STRETCHFLEX was used on similar goods. As for the strength of the mark, the term STRETCHFLEX was not deemed weak or diluted. Since STRETCHFLEX was registered on the Principal Register, it is presumed to be inherently distinctive and would receive the protection afforded to inherently distinctive marks. Hence, factor six also supported a finding of confusion.
The Board n the STRETCHFLEX case also addressed Du Pont factor six, which considers the number and nature of similar marks on similar goods and the strength of the registered mark. The evidence did not demonstrate that the shared term STRETCHFLEX was used on similar goods. As for the strength of the mark, the term STRETCHFLEX was not deemed weak or diluted. Since STRETCHFLEX was registered on the Principal Register, it is presumed to be inherently distinctive and would receive the protection afforded to inherently distinctive marks. Hence, factor six also supported a finding of confusion.
If you need legal advice regarding your trademark rights, assistance with trademark prosecution, or representation in a domain name dispute, contact Wilson Whitaker Rynell. Our team of trademark lawyers has extensive experience in all aspects of trademark and copyright law, including the filing of trademark applications and representing clients in defense or prosecution before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.
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