The terms "secondary meaning" and "acquired distinctiveness" are often used interchangeably. Whether a mark has acquired secondary meaning is a factual matter. In an opposition proceeding (which occurs before a mark is registered), an applicant claiming acquired distinctiveness has the burden of proving secondary meaning by a preponderance of the evidence. However, once the mark is registered (even under 2(f) of the Lanham Act), there is a legal presumption that the mark is valid and either inherently distinctive or has acquired distinctiveness. Consequently, in a cancellation proceeding, the petitioner must overcome the presumption of validity by demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the mark has not acquired distinctiveness. To challenge a registered mark on the grounds that it is merely descriptive, a petitioner must initiate the action before the mark reaches five years of age.
The amount of evidence required to establish secondary meaning depends on the level of descriptiveness of the mark under evaluation. This rule is based on the rationale that a highly descriptive mark is less likely to be perceived by consumers as an indicator of source, thus imposing a greater burden to prove secondary meaning. The point in time relevant for assessing secondary meaning depends on whether the proof is being presented in an opposition or cancellation matter. For instance, in an opposition proceeding, the Board considers facts from the mark's adoption until the filing date of the application, up until the conclusion of the testimony period. In a cancellation proceeding, the petitioner must demonstrate either that the mark was merely descriptive at the time of registration or at the time it is being evaluated by the Board.
Evidence of secondary meaning can be either direct or circumstantial. The primary methods to demonstrate secondary meaning include: (1) owning prior registrations of the same mark; (2) substantially exclusive and continuous use of the mark in commerce for five years or more (third-party use undermines a claim for secondary meaning); (3) circumstantial evidence such as sales volume, duration of use, exclusivity of use, unsolicited media coverage, and advertising expenditures; and (4) introducing direct evidence such as consumer surveys or declarations and affidavits from consumers.
Intentional copying may also be introduced as evidence (if available), which can be indicative of secondary meaning, unless the term being copied is descriptive. If the term is descriptive, the third party's copying might aim to inform consumers about certain qualities. Copying a generic, descriptive, or functional term or design is permissible. However, if the term is fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive, the copying could be an attempt by a third party to benefit from the trademark owner's goodwill and reputation. Enforcement of trademark rights is another factor that may be considered. Proof of enforcement does not necessarily establish secondary meaning because the third-party user may have agreed to refrain from use solely to avoid time-consuming and costly litigation, but it will be taken into account.
Lastly, the prominent use of a trademark is an additional factor to consider. Evidence demonstrating the use of a mark in a manner that allows the relevant public to perceive it as a brand is significant in proving secondary meaning. An example is the case of Roux Laboratories, Inc. v. Clairol, Inc. 427 F.2d 823, 166 USPQ 34 (CCPA 1970), where the phrase "HAIR COLOR SO NATURAL ONLY HER HAIRDRESSER KNOWS FOR SURE" was found to have acquired secondary meaning. It's important to note that the use of ™ or ® symbols in connection with goods or services serves as evidence of the mark owner's efforts to educate consumers that the term is a trademark for their goods or services and/or to indicate that the mark represents a single source. An example is the case of General Foods Corp. v. MGD Partners, 224 USPQ 479 (TTAB 1984), where the Board determined that the use of the mark "HIGH YIELD" for coffee acquired distinctiveness due to the prominent use of the ™ symbol alongside the mark in large font on the packaging, which caused consumers to recognize it as a brand rather than a descriptive term.
If you need legal advice regarding your trademark rights, assistance with trademark prosecution, or representation in a domain name dispute, contact Wilson Whitaker Rynell. Our team of trademark lawyers has extensive experience in all aspects of trademark and copyright law, including the filing of trademark applications and representing clients in defense or prosecution before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.
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